Category Archives: Guidance

Export Control Regimes – EU State Members

Dual use items are products and technologies used for civilian purposes but which may have military applications. Export of dual-use items to destinations outside the EU are prohibited unless a licence has been granted by a national authority.

Dual-use export controls in all EU states is guided by Regulation 428/2009. This regulation sets out the list of technologies and controlled items under export control. It can therefore be expected that, in general, any item considered controlled in one EU jurisdiction would also be controlled in the other jurisdictions.

Transfers of dual-use goods within the EU need a licence only where the item appears on Annex IV of the regulation. Annex IV contains very sensitive goods such as nuclear items.

For exports to destinations outside the EU there are numerous types of licence that may be granted within the EU. These include:

  • EU General Export Authorisations (EU GEAs) – cover exports of certain items to certain destinations as specified in Annex II of the dual-use Regulation.
  • National General Export Authorisations (NGAs) – may be issued by individual EU countries, provided that they:
  • do not conflict with existing CGEA
  • do not cover any of the items listed in Annex IIg to Regulation 428/2009
  • France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the UK
  • Global authorisations – are granted by individual EU countries to one exporter and cover one or more items to one or more countries/end users
  • Individual licenses – are granted by individual EU countries to one exporter and cover exports to one end user


Links for license authorities of each EU state members:


National Authority


Federal Ministry of Economy, Family and Youth


1) The Ministry of the Brussels-Capital Region [Direction des Relations extérieures (external relations directorate)]

2)Flanders Region

3)Wallonn Region


Ministry of Economy, Energy and Tourism [Interdepartmental Commission for Export Control and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction]

[General Information:]

Czech Republic

Ministry of Industry and Trade[Licencing Office]


Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority



Ministry of Foreign Affairs[Strategic Goods Commission]



Department for External Economic Relations in Ministry of Foreign Affairs [export control unit]




Ministry of Industry: Dual-use goods

Ministry of Industry: Defence goods export control

Cryptographic Goods



Federal Office of Economics and Export Control BAFA



Ministry for Development, Competitiveness Infrastructure, Transport and Networks



Hungarian Trade Licensing Office



Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation [Licensing Unit in Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation]



Ministry of Economic Development[Department for Enterprise and Internationalization, Directorate-General for International Trade Policy-Export Control Unit]


Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia [Security Policy Department Strategic Goods Export Control Division]



Ministry of Economy[Trade Department – Division of Strategic Goods Export Control (Licensing Office)]



Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Export Controls




Ministry of Foreign Affairs[Disarmament and Non Proliferation Desk]



Ministry of Finance[Central Import and Export Service (CDIU) on behalf of Ministry of Foreign Affairs]



Department of Economic Security of the Ministry of Economy






Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Department for Export Controls]




Ministry of Economy, Department of Sensitive Goods Trading Management, Division of Sensitive Goods



Ministry of Economic Development and Technology



TRADE – Foreign Trade – Sector Information – Defense and Dual-Use Material



Swedish Agency for Non-proliferation and Export Controls


United Kingdom


Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills [Export Control Organisation]

SPIRE[online export licensing system]


Find more Information here:

Dual Use Controls and License Authorities of Non-EU States

This page provides links to the licensing authorities of countries outside the EU that are a member of one or more of the export control regimes. While it would be too much to assume that the control  lists of these countries align to the EU’ s just because the country is a member of one of the regimes, in general it could be expected that the export control lists of these countries should approximately reflect the structure of the EU’s lists.

Links for license authorities of each Non-EU state members:


Wassenaar Arrangement

Australia Group

Missile Tech. Control Regime

Nuclear Suppliers Group

National Authority






Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto [Direccion de Seguridad Internacional, Asuntos Nucleares y Espaciales]






Defence Export Control Office [DECO]






Ministry of Science and Technology[Department of Nuclear Affairs and Sensitive Assets(DNASA)






Department of Justice



Ministry of Commerce





Ministry of Economy, Labour and Entrepreneurship





Ministry for Foreign Affairs






Ministry of Foreign Affairs[Japan’s Policies on the Control of Arms Exports]






Ministry of Foreign Affairs

New Zealand





Ministry of Foreign Affairs&Trade-International Security and Disarmament Division





Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Republic of Korea





Defence Acquisition Program Administraion

Russian Federation




Federal Service for Technical and Export Control

South Africa




South African Council for the Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction






State Secretariat for Economic Affairs






Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Arms Control and Disarmament Department






State Service of Export Control of Ukraine

United States





Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation-Office of Export Control Cooperation

Note: there are four multilateral export control regimes(MECR) is aim to promote international cooperation developing a robust and binding export control systems of member states.

  • The Wassenaar Arrangement

  • The Australia Group(AG)

  • The Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR)

  • The Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG)

UN Security Council On Effective Practices for the Maritime Transpo

On 12 September 2014, the Governments of Australia and Singapore hosted a symposium in Singapore for the shipping and maritime transportation sector to raise awareness of United Nations sanctions and explore issues relating to compliance with such sanctions. More than 100 representatives participated from across the supply chain and related services, including ship owners and agents, freight forwarders, insurance companies, brokers and port operators, as well as industry associations, regulators and think tanks.

Together with Project Alpha, Singapore and Australia have documented the good practices in compliance identified at the symposium to produce the attached report. We expect that the report will be useful not only to industry but also to Member States and Security Council committees in better understanding the role and good practices of the maritime transportation sector, which is an essential partner in realizing the effective implementation of United Nations sanctions.

This report has been circulated to Member States by the Security Council. It can be downloaded below.


Export Control Guidance Decision Tree

What issues should exporters consider?

The following is a list of four questions which can be used by exporters to help them begin understand the issues of export control. Please note that it is not a comprehensive list.

The four questions are:

  1. Is the technology imported from the US?
  2. Is it on a Controlled List?
  3. What are the end use control issues?
  4. Are there sanctions in place?

If you answer yes to any of the following questions please consult your company’s export licensing control department.


Red Flag Indicators: Detecting Unusual Behaviour in Transactions

The illicit trade in sensitive products and materials is a major problem for international security today. Proliferators work within legitimate trade structures by exploiting weak points in supply chains. They will often employ approaches simultaneously, attempting to disguise their own intentions and actions through a variety of methods. This document will explore some of the ‘red flags’ that appear during transactions that can help exporters to identify illicit behaviour. In doing so, it will consider a number of examples derived from open sources and the work of Project Alpha to better illustrate some of these ‘red flags’ that exporters need to be aware of when dealing with dual-use and nuclear-related materials and products.

If you receive an enquiry you consider suspicious you can often allay concerns through your own research. However, you could also either apply for an export licence or utilise the UK Export Control Organisation’s “End User Advisory Service”. 


UNSCR 1540

In April 2004, the United Nations Security Council voted to adopt UN Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The resolution is important because it calls for states to establish controls on the exports of goods which could be of use in a WMD programme. UNSCR 1977 of 2011 extended the mandate of 1540 and the committee which was set up to monitor 1540 implementation. This page will attempt to deconstruct some of the key elements of Resolution 1540 with the aim of highlighting where it fits in with national control regimes.

Four key things to take from UNSCR1540 are as follows:

·         Resolution 1540 was passed by the Security Council in 2004 in the aftermath of a number of important proliferation developments.

·         After 1540, states were legally required to develop and implement a system of controls on the export of sensitive goods which could have a use in a WMD programme;

·         1540 universalised and formalised the requirement that states address a broader non-proliferation agenda which includes the financing of proliferation and transportation of goods to illicit programmes;

·         1540 first officially highlighted the role that the private sector can play in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

NB: All quotations are taken from UNSCR1540, the original text of which can be found here.

The background to the resolution and each of the following three points will be explored in turn:

Background to 1540

A couple of factors led to the consideration and passing of the resolution at the United Nations:

·         The A Q Khan network was uncovered in the period immediately prior to the consideration of the resolution. The Khan network, centring around Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, was involved in illicit transfers of nuclear technology to a number of proliferant states around the world.

·         The terrorist attacks of 9/11 heightened concerns surrounding the possibility of nuclear terrorism. The first couple of clauses refer to non-state actors.

UNSCR 1977

·         UNSCR 1977 was the follow on to 1540 which extended the mandate of the 1540 committee, set up to monitor implementation around the world.

Controls on Sensitive Exports Universalised

1540 essentially made it mandatory for all states to put in place export controls. Article 3 reads as follows:

Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:

(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;

(b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;

Parts (a) and (b) relate more to measures to secure fissile material (it would be impractical and damaging to trade to enforce domestic controls on dual use technologies for example).

(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;

Part (c) decides that states will establish or continue to maintain border controls and the ability to enforce them.

(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations;

Part (d) decides that states will establish, develop, review and maintain a national export control system over sensitive goods. 

A Broader Agenda

1540 universalised and formalised the requirement that states address a broader non-proliferation agenda which includes the financing of proliferation and transportation of goods to illicit programmes: Article 3 includes that states should establish:

(d) … appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation

Part (d) decides that states should develop laws and regulations relating to the provision of funds and services that would enable proliferation

The Role of the Private Sector

UNSCR 1540 also assigned a role to the private sector in making export controls work, calling upon states:

8 (d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws;

Clause 8 part (d) highlights the need to engage the private sector if they are to be compliant with legislation.

UNSCR 1977 goes further and:

encourages the 1540 Committee, at its discretion, to draw also on relevant expertise, including, civil society and the private sector, with, as appropriate, their State’s consent;