Category Archives: UNSCR2231

North Korea’s Proliferation & Illicit Procurement Apparatus within China

North Korea’s development of weapons of mass destruction, missile delivery systems and conventional military equipment continues despite ever increasing international sanctions. It is known that North Korea relies upon trade in and through China to bypass sanctions. A key knowledge gap relates to what apparatus North Korea maintains in China, especially the border region, to facilitate this. An initial study by King’s College London identified a number of findings:

  • The presence of extensive procurement networks in the Chinese border regions are significant to both North Korea’s economy and support to its military-related programmes, including WMD.
  • It is assessed that North Korea employs a covert system in its attempts to prevent the activities between North Korea-based entities and suppliers being identified.
  • The majority of those entities identified in the China border regions were located in Dandong, although significant numbers were also identified in Dalian and Shenyang. The research to date also found potential presence of North Korean-associated companies in other locations within the Chinese border provinces.
  • Within the cities of Dandong, Dalian and Shenyang many of the entities were found to be collocated suggesting centres for North Korean-related trade, and close proximity to logistic centres.
  • The nationality of the majority of people identified and associated with the entities in this report are assessed to fall into three basic categories;
    • Chinese (citizens) business people who trade with North Korean.
    • Ethnic Koreans of which there are over 2 million who are Chinese citizens living in the border provinces of Jilin, Liaoning and Heilongjiang.
    • North Korean persons living and/or working in the border regions within China.
  • From open source information this study has identified a large number of networks/groups that North Korea could potentially use in support of proliferation-related procurement. However, this is considered to be only part of the potential number of entities that exist.
  • Most of the entities/companies included in international sanctions lists are based in North Korea. So far, of the entities and people identified in this study only two appear in any sanctions list, these being;
    • Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation (UNSCR 1718)
    • Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Company Ltd. (US)
  • A number of companies and individuals identified have been included in UNSCR 1718 PoE reports with the assertion that they have aided North Korean proliferation activity, but have not been included in any sanctions list.

Although this initial study has not identified any new policy recommendations, it has shown that the extent of the problem is potentially far greater than many have previously considered. To have effective sanctions against North Korean proliferation activity cooperation with, and support to, Chinese authorities should be considered.

North Korean Scientists – Chemical and Biological Weapons Programmes

Many consider the North Korean ideology of Juche (self-reliance) to include science and technology as one of its three priority pillars alongside ideology and the military. Given its prominence, in the late 1990’s the DPRK formulated a plan for science and technology development that included investment and scientific exchanges with foreign countries. North Korea continues to be one of the most closed nations, and acquiring information relating to scientists and their work is no exception.  Some technological fields, such as nuclear and military arms technology are considered to be relatively well advanced, but very little is understood regarding any current chemical and biological weapons programmes.

The study by King’s College London aimed to identify where possible scientists that have been recognised through awards and honours for their work in support of North Korea’s ideology and objectives. Specifically those that may be involved in or have conducted research work in support of the DPRK’s suspected chemical and/or biological weapons programmes. Analysis was also conducted in an attempt to identify persons that worked at entities and/or locations suspected of being involved in chemical and/or biological weapons programmes. The findings included;

  • The Order of Kim Il-sung is the highest order of North Korea, along with the Order of Kim Jong-il. Recipients can be individuals or organizations, who have contributed “outstanding services to the Republic of the Korean nation and communism”.
  • The People’s Scientist is an award by the People’s Prize Awarding Commission that works directly under the Cabinet of North Korea.
  • The names of some of the recipients are available but in many cases details of their role, profession and parent organisation are not reported.
  • The overwhelming trend is not to name scientists associated to nuclear or missile-related programmes who have received awards.
  • According to a study by ScienceCentral, analysis of publications from North Korea indexed in the Web of Science Core Collection found 318 articles from North Korea mostly in collaboration with other countries. The study also identified that most research results by North Korean researchers have been published in journals in North Korea.
  • Analysis of data acquired by KCL of over 29,000 papers published in North Korea identified a total of 33 of potential interest. 24 were identified against a list of key terms and a further 9 were identified as topics of potential interest.
  • In most cases there was no additional information about the authors of these papers, or their parent organisations.
  • Entity/location analysis of data extracted from open source websites has identified approximately 1200 people linked to entities or locations that are of possible concern. Of those identified, some are award recipients.
  • Due to its dual use applications chemical and biological research, development and production those involved are possibly more likely to have some public recognition.

unscr2231

What is Resolution 2231?

On 20 July 2015, the fifteen members of the UN Security Council unanimously passed Security Council Resolution 2231 (S/RES/2231). This resolution endorses a long-term plan agreed by the international community to provide enhanced international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program and modifications to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities in exchange for relief from sanctions.

The full text of Resolution 2231 can be accessed here.

The UN also maintains a website dedicated to UNSCR2231. It can be accessed here.

What is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action?

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the long-term plan agreed between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United States, United Kingdom and European Union (known as the P5+1 or E3+3). It contains a detailed set of obligations to be undertaken by Iran and the E3+3 over the next 25 years in order to manage Iran’s nuclear programme, reduce sanctions on Iran, and improve international cooperation between Iran and the E3+3. The JCPOA will also permit Iran to legally purchase equipment for its nuclear programme under what is known as the procurement channel.

The text of the JCPOA can be accessed here.

Who will implement Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA?

Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA place requirements on all parties involved in the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme, and indeed on all other nations. Implementation will be monitored by the United Nations Security Council. The European External Action Service will also play a key role in coordinating the implementation of Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will continue to monitor Iran’s obligations under its nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA.