Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran official, Javad Karimi-Sabet, with former president Ahmadinejad in 2008.
A research prospectus produced in 2006 by the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), and recently obtained by Project Alpha, provides new insights into Iran’s nuclear programme. Continue reading New Project Alpha report: The AEOI Files
MCS’s factory. Image via MCS-Int.de
Iran’s illicit procurement of goods and technology has been a longstanding hallmark of its nuclear and missile programmes. While procurement agents working for these programmes have regularly been caught attempting to purchase goods and materials from foreign companies, one modus operandi Iran is not known to have undertaken is the purchasing of overseas factories to produce sensitive components for nuclear- or missile-related end-users. Continue reading The case of MCS Technologies – did Iran use a German factory for illicit procurement?
Four companies and five individuals have been charged by the US Department of Justice for allegedly devising an international network that supplied the Iranian military and Iran’s nuclear programme with $24 million worth of controlled goods between 2010 and 2015. Continue reading Proliferation Case Study Series: The Nuclear Mechanic
While the United Nations Security Council has unanimously endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed on Iran’s nuclear programme, the treatment of the Iranian ballistic missile programme remains a contentious part of the long-term accord. Continue reading Iran’s missile programme: the post-deal state of play
Project Alpha is pleased to release today a landmark report on Iran’s procurement activities for its nuclear programme. Continue reading Iran’s illicit procurement: past, present and future
Image credit: Mashregh News
The framework agreement for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) reached on 2 April 2015 between Iran and the E3+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, UK, and US, also known as the P5+1), creates the basis for a solution to the Iran nuclear issue over the next 10-20 years. Continue reading An Architecture for Controlling Nuclear-related Trade with Iran
Documents recently leaked in South Africa reveal an attempt by Iranian entities to acquire a furnace and control equipment from a South African firm. Continue reading Proliferation Case Study Series: Electric Furnaces from South Africa
- Iranian company MITEC attempted to procure hundreds of valves for Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor from companies in Germany and India using false front companies in Azerbaijan and Turkey;
- German authorities issued a licence for some of the exports despite warnings from the US of proliferation risks;
- There is confusion surrounding whether the Indian government issued a license for the export;
- Many of the valves and related components were either radiation hardened or bellows-sealed – tell-tale signs of nuclear end uses;
- An Iranian national, Tanideh, acted as a middle man or broker, facilitating the deal between Iranian entities that had been designated for involvement in Iran’s nuclear program and the valve suppliers;
- Four individuals involved were found guilty in late 2013, while Tanideh – the middleman – is currently awaiting trial in Turkey.
In late December of 2014, a 32 year old Austrian named Daniel Frosch appeared in a courtroom in Graz and pleaded guilty to violating Austria’s federal trade laws. For more than a decade prior, Frosch had been a dynamic young international exporter, trading high-tech equipment and technology from bases in Austria, the UAE and the Philippines. Continue reading New Alpha case study: The illicit trade network of Daniel Frosch