Daniel Liu, Researcher (email@example.com)
Click here to access the Report: Karl Lee where is he now ?
- Internationally sanctioned and alleged nuclear proliferator Li Fangwei (李方伟) a.k.a: Karl Lee, almost certainly remains active in Dalian China, where he continues to attempt to export Graphite and Graphene related goods internationally.
- Li’s current most likely locations are: Songshuzhen, Wafangdian County, Dalian, Liaoning, China (中国辽宁省大连市瓦房店市松树镇), and 2501-2508 Yuexiu Building, No. 82 Xinkai Road, Xigang District, Dalian Liaoning, China(中国辽宁西岗区新开路82号越秀大厦2501-2508室).
- Li’s network of shell companies continues to morph in corporate officers and owners to avoid sanctions scrutiny. Yet core individuals, companies’ Chinese name and physical assets remain the same. The current fourth iteration of this proliferation network is probably focused around Sinotech Carbon, a.k.a: TST Carbon, a.k.a: Dalian Zhongchuang Carbon(大连中创炭素有限公司).
- The network is run by more than just Li Fangwei. Court records, company ownership data and local government tax records show that Li Fangwei’s family and other close associates are actively taking part in the network’s business activity. They act as sales representatives, lawyers and shareholders across many companies in the Li network. Li is also not above committing identity fraud by using the name of a deceased woman believed to be his late mother to register shareholdings.
- From 2015 to 2016, around the time of US indictment and seizure of Li’s US based financial assets, the network has embarked on a series of highly opportunistic law suits in Chinese civil courts. This was possible done to recoup their losses. These cases typically involved using loopholes in Chinese commercial caselaw to compel Chinese companies to complete a sale to Li network companies despite their objects of proliferation risk, or intervention by local export control authorities, then requesting further damages for lost profits.
- Yet after years of international sanctions and asset freezes, the Li network may be under strain and local government tolerance may be waning. As of September 2018, local government bodies have issued a cease and desist order on Sinotech Carbon due to environmental protection concerns.
A Report by Dr Jonathan Brewer
Illustration credit: Jason Robinson—originally published in the ACAMS Today magazine, a publication of the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (ACAMS).
Combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a key priority for the international community. One of the tools for doing this is disruption of the networks used to finance proliferation. However, detecting financing of proliferation (FoP) is difficult and requires a better understanding of the typologies.
The most comprehensive study of FoP to date was published by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2008. Since then, largely due to sanctions on Iran and DPRK, more information on FoP has become available. The King’s College Study of Typologies of Financing of Proliferation is collecting and analyzing information held by governments and the banking and financial sector in order to publish reports on current FoP typologies. Additional indicators identified by this report could possibly be visible to banks and financial institutions that may be unknowingly involved in processing related transactions.
This Interim Report comprises analyses of 18 case studies, based on information supplied to the Study to date, contained in reports of UN Panels on Iran and DPRK, and in documents relating to a small selection of US Department of Justice actions.
The King’s College London Study will continue to collect and analyse data on FoP from governments and the private sector, and will publish a final report in July 2017.
The study is accessible below:
Study of Typologies of Financing of Proliferation Interim Report 5 Feb 2017
A series of allegations made in June has re-awakened the issue of Pakistani nuclear cooperation with North Korea. These allegations, published by an Indian news agency, state that Pakistani authorities have continued to supply nuclear-related material to North Korea, in violation of sanctions.
Project Alpha sought to substantiate or otherwise the allegations utilising open source information. The purpose of this case study is to set out what steps were taken and what information was validated such that follow-on study might be undertaken, should further information become available that could allow a conclusion to be drawn about the validity of the allegations.
The report can be downloaded from the link below:
US-based metals trader Erdal Kuyumcu, arrested 1 March for allegedly violating US export control laws (source: Google+)
Amidst the ongoing efforts of Iran to satisfy its nuclear commitments as set out in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and praise for Iranian compliance, the CEO of a U.S. metallurgical company was arrested on March 1 on charges of illegal export of a dual-use cobalt-based powder to Iran. Continue reading US trader charged with illegal export of metal powder to Iran
MCS’s factory. Image via MCS-Int.de
Iran’s illicit procurement of goods and technology has been a longstanding hallmark of its nuclear and missile programmes. While procurement agents working for these programmes have regularly been caught attempting to purchase goods and materials from foreign companies, one modus operandi Iran is not known to have undertaken is the purchasing of overseas factories to produce sensitive components for nuclear- or missile-related end-users. Continue reading The case of MCS Technologies – did Iran use a German factory for illicit procurement?
Four companies and five individuals have been charged by the US Department of Justice for allegedly devising an international network that supplied the Iranian military and Iran’s nuclear programme with $24 million worth of controlled goods between 2010 and 2015. Continue reading Proliferation Case Study Series: The Nuclear Mechanic
Documents recently leaked in South Africa reveal an attempt by Iranian entities to acquire a furnace and control equipment from a South African firm. Continue reading Proliferation Case Study Series: Electric Furnaces from South Africa
- Iranian company MITEC attempted to procure hundreds of valves for Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor from companies in Germany and India using false front companies in Azerbaijan and Turkey;
- German authorities issued a licence for some of the exports despite warnings from the US of proliferation risks;
- There is confusion surrounding whether the Indian government issued a license for the export;
- Many of the valves and related components were either radiation hardened or bellows-sealed – tell-tale signs of nuclear end uses;
- An Iranian national, Tanideh, acted as a middle man or broker, facilitating the deal between Iranian entities that had been designated for involvement in Iran’s nuclear program and the valve suppliers;
- Four individuals involved were found guilty in late 2013, while Tanideh – the middleman – is currently awaiting trial in Turkey.
Continue reading Illicit Procurement of German and Indian Valves for Iran’s Arak Heavy Water Reactor
In December 2012, a shipment of high-strength carbon fibre bound for Iran was interdicted and seized in Singapore. This case study provides an overview of the carbon fibre seizure and the entities involved in the attempted shipment, which span Iran, mainland China, Hong Kong and Georgia. Continue reading Interdicted carbon fibre: Proliferation Case Study Series
This case study represents one of a series of indictments released in December 2012, announcing charges against four individuals involved in the illegal exports of goods with military and dual use purposes to Iran. Continue reading Helicopter Parts to Iran