Category Archives: News and Events

The Jian-Manpho Bridge: Another Failed Attempt at Economic Integration or One More Nail in the Coffin of “Maximum Pressure”?

Theo Clement, Research Associate (theo.clement@kcl.ac.uk)

The Jian-Manpho Bridge: Another Failed Attempt at Economic Integration or One More Nail in the Coffin of “Maximum Pressure”?

As recent fieldwork interviews and press reports suggest, the opening of the Jian-Manpho bridge linking China and the DPRK reflects an increased Chinese willingness to openly engage with the North Korean economy. While the borderlands have a long history of failed economic integration projects, the simultaneous opening of a third economic cooperation corridor near Manpho (in addition to Sinuiju and Rason) and a sudden rise in bilateral agreements might mean Beijing’s patience with “maximum pressure” is wearing thin and that Chinese businesses want to reestablish ties with Pyongyang before Seoul does.

Can the Iran nuclear deal survive as the IAEA investigates Israeli allegations?

Emma Scott, Research Assistant (emma.l.scott@kcl.ac.uk)

Ian J. Stewart, Project Alpha Director (ian.j.stewart@kcl.ac.uk)

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Can the Iran nuclear deal survive as the IAEA investigates Israeli allegations?

Since last spring when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that his country had seized secret Iranian nuclear files, from an undisclosed warehouse in early 2018, Israeli and US officials have pushed for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to take action. News emerged in early April that it had done so.

Officials in Israel and to some extent the United States maintain that holding such an archive violates the Iranian nuclear deal of 2015. To date the agency hasn’t publicly commented on the material, but it is known that Israel has shared some or all of it with officials there.

In order for the IAEA to develop a so-called “broader conclusion” that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, officials are investigating Israel’s materials and conducting the necessary site visits. Given the skepticism with which many view the nature of Iran’s nuclear objectives, it looks increasingly untenable that the IAEA could reach a broader conclusion seen as credible by all. This has profound implications for the future of the nuclear accord with Iran.

Internship Opportunity

Project Alpha works to understand and counter procurement of technologies with a use in UN-restricted nuclear and missile programmes, as pursued by Iran, North Korea, and others. The Project has numerous strands that contribute to this objective, including educating industry on export controls and proliferation risks, researching the techniques used by proliferators to acquire goods illicitly, and conducting international outreach to improve the implementation of trade controls in third countries. Alpha also actively supports the work of UN organisations, the IAEA, and national governments.

The Alpha team are looking for one or more interns to work with the project for the next three to six months. The focus of the internship will be split between analytical research and administrative support to the team. Interns may also have the opportunity to conduct and publish research on issues related to non-proliferation and sanctions. Duties are as follows:

  • To conduct open source research under the direction of the project staff into illicit WMD procurement
  • To assist the project staff in maintaining the project’s online platform
  • To assist Alpha’s staff in the preparation of articles and other briefing material on proliferation-related procurement by conducting open source research and analysis
  • To work closely with Alpha staff in the preparation and running of a series of workshops.

Candidates should be able to commit to working in the office for at least two half days per week, should have excellent analytical and organisational skills (with experience of event organisation and management), and should have impeccable writing skills. Additional language skills and knowledge of open source analytical trade-craft are a plus.

If you have applied before and were not successful, you are welcome to apply again.

Starting date is after Easter, so candidates are welcome to apply as soon as possible.

Interested parties should send a CV and cover letter to Emma Scott (emma.l.scott@kcl.ac.uk) as soon as possible.

What the Hanoi Summit Tells Us About North Korea’s Nuclear Intentions

Christopher Watterson, Research Associate (christopher.watterson@kcl.ac.uk)

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What the Hanoi Summit Tells Us About North Korea’s Nuclear Intentions

The second U.S.-North Korea summit was a bust, with Kim and Trump leaving Hanoi without any mutual concessions or even a joint statement. In a post-mortem press conference North Korea explained its negotiating position, stating that it was willing to verifiably decommission the Yongbyon site in exchange for sanctions relief. While this would appear to be a significant concession given that Yongbyon contains North Korea’s only operational 5 MWe reactor and proven uranium enrichment facility, this article argues that the North Korean offer does not represent a sincere commitment to denuclearisation but rather an intention to shift its nuclear weapons enterprise away from the Yongbyon site.

Fallout from Kim-Trump Summit “No Deal”

Fallout from Kim-Trump Summit “No Deal”

The much-hyped second summit between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un ended prematurely earlier today with both sides unable to come to an agreement on sanctions relief and DPRK concessions. Today’s failure highlights the broader tensions in normalising relations with North Korea that are likely to persist well beyond the current US presidency.

From media reports coming out of Hanoi, it appears the stumbling block was over an apparently simple trade-off: what sanctions would be eased and in return for what denuclearisation steps by the DPRK?

Ahead of the summit, there was a sense from some DPRK watchers that some sanctions could be lifted – including certain UN measures – but most must stay in place to maintain pressure on Pyongyang in order to nudge it towards compliance in the future. In terms of denuclearisation, reports suggest that Kim was prepared to freeze or close parts or all of the Yongbyon nuclear facility which houses the country’s plutonium production reactor and its only known uranium centrifuge facility. However, this is but one of several nuclear facilities that the DPRK is believed to have. Therefore, a freeze or closure would not assuredly and irreversibly end the country’s nuclear program. This point weighs on the mind of many analysts as North Korea has previously rowed back on similar freezes in its program.

While at first glance, the differences in two sides’ positions might seem reconcilable, Pyongyang’s apparent insistence on lifting all economic sanctions at once apparently prevented the two parties from reaching an agreement. While Pyongyang’s game plan is still somewhat unclear, recent events give more credence to the idea that Kim would not give up his nuclear weapons program for only an easing of sanctions. Indeed, it should be borne in mind that the DPRK’s controversial nuclear and ballistic programs do not only constitute a strong security guarantee for Pyongyang, but also provide a tool to demonstrate that the regime is using a wide array of instruments to secure concessions from the US, ranging from a peace treaty to the Korean War to assistance in economic development.

Many in the West will welcome the US’ willingness to walk away from the summit. While Kim may not be prepared to trade the nuclear weapons programme for sanctions relief, many states in the West will feel that sanctions relief should not be granted in exchange for anything else. So, there may be some relief around Western capitals that no meaningful concessions were made.

Depending on how one reads Kim’s strategy, the failure in Hanoi might not be a complete loss. Ahead of the summit, numerous countries were positioning themselves to re-enter the North Korean market assuming that sanctions would be eased. Based on Project Alpha’s work, it seems likely that North Korea will find more lax enforcement of sanctions in many parts of the world following its diplomatic efforts with the US. One key question left unanswered after the summit is the impact of the “no deal” on current North-South dialogue. Absent a full lifting of sanctions, South Korean president Moon Jae-in will not be able to pursue its policy of economic engagement with the North – unless they break said sanctions.

Perhaps more problematically from the US perspective, the North’s engagement with South Korea is likely to continue to progress even absent a US-North Korea agreement. This may result in pressure to reopen the joint industrial zone. The US could then find itself being cast as the foreign force obstructing a further easing of tensions on the peninsula. Whereas all North-South declarations since the historical 2000 inter-Korean summit enshrined the principle of a Korean reunification led by Koreans alone. We may expect to see Kim Jong-un complaining to his Southern counterpart about what he will perceive as Trump’s stubbornness, increasing pressure on South Korea’s already difficult diplomatic position.

The status quo will also not help Kim getting the much-needed foreign investment that was pledged by South Korea, and, apparently, already agreed on by Chinese companies. The previous summit allowed the DPRK to emerge as a rational and “normal” diplomatic actor, and this episode did nothing but confirm this trend, offering a glimpse into Pyongyang’s negotiation tactics. However, from North Korean’s point of view, the “no deal” in Hanoi, unless if part of a larger strategy, might give Trump administration to upper hand in any future negotiations. While the current diplomatic sequence was started by the DPRK following Kim Jong-un’s 1st of January 2018 speech, by walking away from the negotiation table the Trump administration is imposing its own agenda. Time will tell if Pyongyang will compromise on its “all or nothing” bargaining position or if we go back to brinkmanship.

 

 

 

The EU Should Tackle Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program

Emma Scott, Research Assistant (emma.l.scott@kcl.ac.uk)

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The EU Should Tackle Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program

The EU has stated that it is leading a “dialogue” with Iran to address regional issues, as well as other issues of concern including the ballistic missile program. The question is how the EU is framing the negotiating agenda on Iran’s ballistic missile program. Is its position similar to the US position or does it diverge? The EU has maintained that it shares “most of the concerns expressed by the US regarding the status of Iran’s nuclear program after 2025, ‘Iran’s ballistic missiles program’ and its destabilising actions in the region.” However, it has failed to address or expand on these concerns. While the E3 has been willing to discuss missiles with the Trump administration—albeit in talks that ended when the US quit the JCPOA in May 2018—the EU has only referred to Iran’s ballistic missile program in public statements focused on preserving the JCPOA. It has yet to address the missile program as a stand-alone issue with implications for European security, the Middle East and the theme of proliferation more broadly.

Russian Sanctions: Are They Working, Workable, and Worth It?

Steve Osborne, Senior Research Associate, (stephen.osborne@kcl.ac.uk)

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Russian Sanctions: Are They Working, Workable, and Worth It?

Russian actions in Ukraine led to sanctions being imposed by the EU, the United States, and several other international partners. There is little evidence to date that these sanctions have had significant effect on Russia’s economy or behaviour. But the question of effectiveness is far from simple. The paper will address why effectiveness has been limited – is it a matter of scope, enforcement or priority? What is meant by effectiveness in this context -what would effectiveness look like? The paper will also look at the design of the sanctions – what effects if any were they meant to have, and were they ever meant to have an economic impact? Is there evidence of sanctions evasion by Russia, or are volumes of affected trade so low as to make enforcement measures insignificant? If there is a political will to increase enforcement, or to use sanctions as part of a policy to restrain Russian aggression, how might such aims be achieved? The paper will engage systematically with existing literature, dealing both with the theory of sanctions, and on studies undertaken on the subject of sanctions effectiveness; trade data and licensing statistics; as well as EU reporting.

Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) Three Years On: the UN Secretary General’s Sixth Report

By Emma Scott, Research Assistant

The UN Secretary General has now released his sixth report on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which governs the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (i.e. the nuclear deal with Iran). The UN Secretary General issues a report every six months to assess the implementation of the resolution. Project Alpha has been following these reports. Herein, we provide an analysis of the of this sixth report’s key findings in light of the former reports, and specifically related to the implementation of the nuclear related provisions; the ballistic missile related provisions; and the restrictions on the missile transfers or activities.

 

Key findings of the report include:

  • 5 new proposals submitted through the Procurement Channel, which brings the total number of proposals submitted to 42
  • 2 of the 6 cases of illicit procurement activity set out in the previous report did not meet the criteria set out in the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines of Nuclear Related Dual Use Equipment, therefore did not require advanced approval by the Security Council; enquiries into the other 4 cases are ongoing
  • Component parts of 3 additional ballistic missile launches at Saudi Arabia by the Houthis had features consistent with those of the Iranian Qiam-1 short-range ballistic missile, as previously examined
  • Two container launch units for anti-tank guided missiles recovered by Saudi-led coalition in Yemen had characteristics of an Iranian manufacturer

 

Nuclear-related provisions

Since 12 June 2018, only 5 new proposals have been submitted through the Procurement Channel, bringing the total number of proposals submitted from 37 to 42. This figure is significantly down on the 13 proposals submitted in the previous reporting period 8 December 2017 – 12 June 2018. There has been no increase on the number of proposals approved or disapproved since the last report in June 2018, and there has been a slight increase from 7 to 9 proposals withdrawn since June 2018. Although, the procurement channel was slow to take-off from the beginning, it appears that it is slowing down further and not really functioning as a mechanism on the whole, and particularly, in the aftermath of the Trump withdrawal from the JCPOA.

Status of the Procurement Channel
Reporting Period No. of proposals submitted in the reporting period No. of proposals submitted since implementation day (16 January) No. of proposals approved No. of proposals not approved since implementation day No. of proposals withdrawn implementation day No. of Proposals under review
16 January 2016 – 12 July 2016 1 1 0 0 1 0
13 July 2016 – 30 December 2016 5 6 3 0 1 2
31 December 2016 – 20 June 2017 10 16 10 0 2 4
21 June 2017 – 8 December 2017 8 24 16 3 5 0
9 December 2017 – 12 June 2018 13 37 24 3 7 3
13 June 2018 – 6 December 2018 5 42 28 4 9 1

 

Ballistic Missile-related activities by Iran

In early January 2017, approximately, one year following implementation day of the JCPOA, and in the weeks following President Trump assuming office, reports started to emerge of Iran testing a range of ballistic missiles. The UN Secretary General’s reports have indicated approximately 20 tests conducted in the last two years, the details of which are briefly outlined in the table below.

Ballistic Missile launches or tests by Iran since 16 January 2016
Date of Launch/Test Type of missile/SLV Type/Reason for Launch Reporting State/outlet
15 November 2016 Qiam Flight test Israel
29 January 2017 Khorramshahr medium range ballistic missile Flight test Confirmed by Iran
18 June 2017 Ballistic missiles Retaliation against targets in Syria Israel
19 June 2017
4 July 2017 Medium range ballistic missile medium range ballistic missile Flight test US + E3
27 July 2017 Simorgh SLV Not mentioned US + E3
2 January 2018 Shahab-3 variant Flight test Israel
5 January 2018 Scud variant Flight test Israel
February 2018 Zolfaghar Flight test Israel
April 2018 Khorramshahr Flight test Israel
May 2018 Zolfaghar Flight test Israel
May 2018 Shahab-3 variant Flight test Israel
June 2018 Shahab-3 variant Flight test Israel
August 2018 Qiam Flight test Israel
August 2018 Zolfaghar Flight test Israel
30 September Unknown (x 5) Retaliation against targets in Syria Israel (reported in Iranian media)
1 October
1 December 2018 Medium range ballistic missile Test firing United States

 

While Iran has not categorically confirmed all of these tests, it has not denied all of them either with the exception of those reported by Israel between January and August 2018. Iran explicitly confirmed the 2017 test of the Khorramshahr missile maintaining that the test did not contradict the JCPOA nor resolution 2231. Paragraph 3 of resolution 2231 “calls” upon Iran “not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology […]”.[1] The phrase “calls” is not the affirmative “decides” language of the Security Council as specified in resolution 1929 (2010) prior to the signing of the JCPOA. Consequently, the Security Council is blocked over the continuation of the program and the interpretation of 2231.

The US, alongside the United Kingdom, and France, as well as Germany have jointly reacted to the recent launches. These states maintain that they are “destabilising and provocative” and conducted in defiance of resolution 2231.[2] They, alongside Israel, further maintain that the phrase “ballistic missiles designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons” includes all Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I systems, defined as those capable of delivering at least a 500kg payload to a range of at least 300km. Consequently, they say, as the missiles can be categorised as such, they are inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons.[3]

Within the context of Security Council reporting, China has been silent on the issue, while Russia has been coming to Iran’s aid. Russia maintains firstly that there is no legal prohibition through resolution 2231 on the development by Iran of missile and space programs and secondly there is no information that Iran’s ballistic missiles are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. In line with Iran, Russia also maintains that the Category I parameters of the MTCR (of which Russia is a member) were never intended to be used in the context of the resolution.[4]

Iran’s position is threefold. Firstly, it maintains that its ballistic missiles have not been designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and are thus outside the purview of resolution 2231. Secondly, Iran’s missile activities are part of its conventional deterrence and defensive capabilities, and nothing in resolution 2231 prohibits conventional missile activity.[5] Thirdly, Iran argues the definition of the MTCR is not an internationally agreed upon definition, and there is no reference to MTCR criteria in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231, therefore MTCR criteria is not applicable.[6]

Iran’s most recent test on 1 December 2018 caused further cause for complaint by the US and key European member states, but in the closed-door Security Council meeting which followed there was no consensus. Taking advantage of the blockage, Iran has said it will continue to develop and test ballistic missiles and is unwilling to engage in dialogue on the issue.[7] Consequently, despite the growing frequency, range and performance of the missiles, the status quo seems unlikely to change.

 

Ballistic Missile-related transfers or activities with Iran

Beyond the question of missile development and testing, the issue of ballistic-missile related transfers to and from Iran also remains. The question is whether Iran has transferred the missiles, parts thereof, or related technology to the Houthis in Yemen. Any such transfer post 16 January 2016 would constitute a violation of annex B to resolution 2231, which requires states to obtain prior approval from the Security Council for the supply, sale or transfer to or ‘from’ Iran of all items set out in the Missile Technology Control Regime list.

The Houthis could not apply for such authorisation because they are not a recognised UN member state, but rather a non-state actor, and such authorisation if requested by Iran would in any case never be granted because UN Security Council resolution 2216 (2015) on Yemen established an arms embargo on the Houthis. Therefore, the transfer of weaponry by Iran to the Houthis would also constitute a violation of 2216.

Launches of missiles by the Houthis in Yemen at Saudi territory began in July 2017. Since, there has been 14 launches in total. According to assessments by UN authorities, the missiles launched shared key design features with a known type of missile manufactured in Iran – the Qiam 1 short range ballistic missile.[8] Putting the question of regional stability aside, the overarching problem is the proliferation of ballistic missile technology in the Middle East, and the spread of such technology to non-state actors. Iran’s categorical denials of these transfers illustrate that it is not the Iranian government’s official position to support the Houthis and proliferate ballistic technology, probably because the views in Tehran are unlikely to be united on these issues. However, Iranian denials are questionable in view of the evidence presented by the Secretary General, leaving a certain amount of responsibility for proliferation in the region with Iran.

 

Launches by the Houthis at the Territory of Saudi Arabia
Date of Launch Number of Missiles Launches Name/Type of Missile Launched
22 July 2017 1 Qiam-1 (a Scud variant)
4 November 2017 1 Qiam-1
19 November 2017 1 Qiam-1
5 January 2018 1 Qiam-1
30 January 2018 1 Qiam-1
25 March 2018 3 Qiam-1
11 April 2018 1 Qiam-1
9 May 2018 2 Not mentioned
5 June 2018 1 Not mentioned
24 June 2018 2 Qiam-1

 

Arms-related provisions

Since the first report, the Secretary General has reported extensively on arms shipments to and from Iran. Resolution 2231 has two main provisions related to conventional arms. The first provision, paragraph 5 of annex B requires states to obtain prior approval from the Security Council on a case-by-case basis for supplying, selling, or transferring ‘to’ Iran the seven categories of arms defined by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.[9] In the three-year period since implementation day of the JCPOA, the UN Secretary General has only reported on one proposal to the Security Council,[10] the outcome of which has not been publicly divulged thus far. In addition, there have been another three instances of attempted unauthorised shipments to Iran – two of which were prevented by Ukrainian authorities, and one by Turkish authorities.

In the second provision concerning paragraph 6 (b) of resolution 2231, the Security Council decided to prevent, unless decided otherwise on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale or transfer of arms ‘from’ Iran. No reports exist of Iran trying to use this mechanism and it seems unlikely in view of political circumstances, that any such request would be authorised. Instead, approximately 14 cases have been mentioned in the Secretary General’s reports where arms and related materials assessed to be of Iranian origin have been seized or recovered by fellow UN member states’ authorities. Iran has not responded to the accusations.

Finally, Iran has also been found to be displaying defence equipment in international defence exhibitions on 5 occasions, in Iraq (x 3), in Turkey (x1), and in Azerbaijan (x1). Iran’s justification for not asking for prior Security Council authorisation was that no prior approval was required because Iran retained ownership of the items exhibited. The Secretary General has requested to the Security Council to clarify whether paragraph 6 also includes temporary transfers, but the Security Council has yet to respond.

Although, the evidence from member states seems to indicate that Iran is not respecting the arms embargo imposed upon it, the Secretary General and the Secretariat continue to examine much of the evidence submitted by them. To determine a violation of resolution 2231, the transfers emanating from Iran must have taken place after implementation day on 16 January 2016.

 

Conclusion

Three years on Iran’s nuclear, ballistic missile, and arms programs are as divisive as ever, both in the region and further afield. So far, Iran is implementing its nuclear related commitments under the JCPOA. In the author’s opinion, the possibility of US military action aside, Iran will continue to do so until the easing of restrictions begin on the nuclear program in 2025. The question here is in view of President Trump’s withdrawal from the current deal, will Iran be willing to sign up to an agreement covering the period post 2025?

Restrictions will be lifted of the ballistic missile activity in 2023. However, at present, Iran seems determined to continue its ballistic activities and ballistic proliferation in the region in defiance of Western calls of condemnation and concern. The ballistic programme already high on the U.S. agenda is also rising on political agendas in Europe, so the question for another article is how should Europe respond?

The embargo on conventional arms will be lifted in 2020, but even for now, it is proving difficult to impose. In this case, the question is whether and which states will be publicly willing to engage in conventional arms transfers with Iran in the post-2020 period – only two years from now.

 

[1] UN Security Council, Resolution 2231 (2015), S/RES/2231 ()2015, 20 July 2015.

[2] UN Security Council, Third report of the Secretary General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), S/2017/515, 20 June 2017.

[3] Ibid.

[4] UN Security Council, Fourth report of the Secretary General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), S/2017/1030, 8 December 2017.

[5] Op. cit. UN Security Council, Third report of the Secretary General…, S/2017/515, 20 June 2017.

[6] UN Security Council, Fifth report of the Secretary General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), S/2018/602, 12 June 2018.

[7] Tasnim News Agency, ‘’Iran to Continue Testing Homegrown Missiles: General”, 02 December 2018, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2018/12/02/1889585/iran-to-continue-testing-homegrown-missiles-general

[8] UN Security Council, Fifth report of the Secretary General…, S/2018/602, 12 June 2018.

[9] The seven categories of arms as defined by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms include battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles, or missile systems.

[10] UN Security Council, Second report of the Secretary General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), S/2016/1136, 30 December 2016.

Project Alpha is Hiring: Multiple Positions to be Filled

Project Alpha (https://projectalpha.eu) at KCL works at the intersection of non-proliferation, trade control, illicit trade and emerging technology. The team’s work includes leading edge policy and academic research on these topics and training and capacity building in relation to non-proliferation trade controls.

We are looking to augment our staff through hiring for a range of positions. Initially, all of the following positions will be available through the King’s Talent Bank, but it is anticipated that postdoctoral positions will be advertised through the KCL jobs board in early 2018.

Research Associates (grade 6)

We are interested in talking to post-docs with a PhD in a relevant area about short term and potentially longer-term research roles covering topics including:

  • Archival research related to non-proliferation
  • Production of academic articles related to non-proliferation and trade controls
  • Pursuit of other research interests in line with the Alpha Non-proliferation Programme’s objective.

Note: we will be advertising longer term Post-Doctoral positions through King’s Hirewire in the near future.

 

Research Interns, Affiliates and Assistants (Grade  3, 4 and 5 pay scale)

We are recruiting for a number of positions to undertake a mix of the following tasks.

  • To collect and analyse data on issues related to non-proliferation and sanctions. In the immediate term, this will likely be related to entity information on DPRK and Iranian entities.
  • To package existing data and research into stories for web and media outlets
  • To contribute to analytical articles written by senior staff
  • To conduct archival research as directed by senior staff 

Candidates for the research intern and associate positions will be invited to discuss their research interests with senior project staff. As such, candidates should have an understanding of how their research interests fit with the project’s work.

Applicants at the grade 5 “Research Assistant” grade will have a Masters degree or equivalent experience in a relevant topic.

To apply, visit:

https://www.directtemping.com/jobs/show/7251/research-associates%2C-assistants%2C-affiliates-and-interns

Research Translators (grade 3/4)

 We are also looking to hire a small number of part time translators who have an understanding of the non-proliferation and security field to assist in our research. Desirable languages including Mandarin, Korean, Farsi and Arabic. While the work will involve translation of a small number of full-length documents, the main role of these posts will be in conducting foreign language search to retrieve news and results of relevance then summarising the findings for the research team.

To apply, visit: https://www.directtemping.com/jobs/show/7252/research-translators

 

IT Developer (Grade 7)

We are looking to hire a developer to support and improve our apache web server based software stack which uses Drupal 7 as a front end. The stack runs on an Azure virtual machine. This position could be extended for the foreseeable future and is suitable for a part time role. The tasks will include:

  • Server maintenance including installation of server updates etc
  • Addition of content to Drupal and modification of Drupal views
  • Development of new Drupal modules
  • Data visualisation